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This contribution provides evidence for the hypothesis that trade increases growth through its 
curbing effect on capital taxes. The analysed mechanism includes two different steps and 
considers the critical points of both the theoretical and empirical studies in this field. In 
particular, the estimation problems of omitted variables and parameter heterogeneity are 
addressed. Using panel data for a sample of 12 OECD countries in the time period 1967-1996, 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, new achievements in macroeconomic theory and the intensified debate on the 
consequences of globalisation have revitalized the general interest in the relationship between 
trade and growth. Whereas earlier empirical contributions such as Michaely (1977), Dollar 
(1992), Edwards (1992) and Sachs and Warner (1995) find a positive impact of trade and 
open trade policies
1 on the growth rate, recent papers do not come to unanimous conclusions. 
Edwards (1998) confirms the earlier results but Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) remain very 
skeptical regarding the general validity of the positive connection. Moreover, some recent 
cross-country studies suffer from methodological problems, see Levine and Renelt (1992) and 
Temple (1999).  As the issue is at the heart of the current macroeconomic debate, it is thus 
rewarding to reconsider the evidence provided so far. From the theoretical background, scale 
and resource reallocation effects of goods trade and different impacts of factor trade can be 
considered as possible links between trade and growth. But only by confronting theoretical 
predictions with the data it becomes possible to pick out the main mechanisms at work. 
Accordingly, the identification of a theoretically founded and empirically substantial channel 
between trade and growth is the purpose of the present contribution.  
The approach chosen in this paper focuses on a topic which has been treated in several 
strands of literature but not in the current context of trade and growth: the channel working 
through capital taxes. According to tax competition theory, increasing globalisation forces 
governments to reduce taxes on more mobile assets such as capital. If lower capital taxes are 
postulated to foster investments and economic growth, the required connection is readily 
given: the pressure on exactly those taxes that seem to be crucial for growth is able to provide 
a direct link between trade and growth. The underlying model is very intuitive. Furthermore, 
it can be derived from first principles. But, nevertheless, it has been challenged by important 
contributions. Regarding tax competition, empirical studies, especially Garrett  (1995), 
Quinn  (1997) and Swank  (1998), do not find the predicted results in the data. On the 
theoretical level, Uhlig and Yanagawa (1996) show that in an overlapping generations 
economy lower capital taxes can decrease the growth rate. This may happen because taxing 
capital relieves the tax burden on the young generation which enables it to save more. 
We will argue that the empirical doubts about the validity of tax competition theory 
can be cleared up once we use appropriate data and estimation models. On the other hand, 
                                                 
1 Some authors, such as Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999), emphasise the distinction between trade and trade 
policies. We will refer to both variables separately in the estimations.   2
while the result of Uhlig and Yanagawa has to be appreciated to highlight one possible case in 
theoretical considerations, it does not materialize in our data sample. On the contrary, the 
empirical results show that, for developed countries, the hypothesis of capital taxes as a link 
between trade and growth can be confirmed. The empirical equations used below include 
additional variables which have proven to be robust in this context. Regarding openness, the 
impact of both trade volumes and trade policy on economic growth is included in the analysis. 
Given the problems of differences in comparative advantage and of data quality, the sample 
used for empirical estimations includes 12 OECD countries. Panel data for five year periods 
in the time-frame 1967-1996 have been constructed to take advantage of the corresponding 
estimation methods.  
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents several 
theoretical approaches and econometric issues related to the empirical estimation of the 
impact of trade on growth. In Section 3, the different theoretical and empirical aspects are 
condensed into a model showing the impact of trade on taxes and of taxes on growth. In 
Section 4, the data are described. Section 5 presents the estimation results for 12 OECD 
countries and Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Theory and Recent Evidence 
Given the multidimensional relationship between trade and growth, a scatter plot of trade 
shares and growth rates yields interesting casual insights but no clear two-dimensional 
relationship, see Figure 1 for the panel data used in the empirical estimations below. As can 
be seen from the figure, the USA and Japan have relatively high growth rates and low trade 
shares while some European countries have high trade shares and average or below-average 
growth rates. As a consequence, more relationships and variables must be introduced to 
discover the impact of trade on growth. 
 
 
*** Figure 1 *** 
(about here) 
 
Regarding theory, a possible link between trade and growth, especially known from 
new trade and growth theory, are scale effects. In the international context, trade between 
similar partners is likely to increase the size of variables such as public knowledge, which are 
generally assumed to be important for growth, see Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) and Eaton   3
and Kortum (2001) for the theoretical aspects and Keller (2002) for empirical evidence on the 
intensity and determinants of international knowledge diffusion. Scale effects are certainly 
present but they are limited in geographical extension and are possibly weaker than first 
assumed in new growth theory. Trade between partners that differ with respect to factor 
endowments has additional effects. Depending on resource reallocation between sectors as a 
consequence of trade, goods and factors trade can have either effect on growth. Accordingly, 
a multi-sector growth model of the open economy does not necessarily predict a positive 
impact of trade on the growth rate, see Grossman and Helpman (1991) and the example in 
Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999). In addition, trade can have pro-competitive effects. But 
regarding growth, these effects are not unambiguous either. In R&D growth models, for 
example, stiffer competition in the research sector fosters growth while increased competition 
in the differentiated goods sector lowers the growth rate, because profits from differentiated 
goods provide the compensation for successful innovations.  
A different link between trade and growth consists in the effects of factors trade. Here, 
one important issue is the role of taxes, which has been less discussed in this context so far. 
The reasoning of tax competition theory is as follows. In equilibrium, the marginal benefits of 
public activities correspond to the marginal costs of taxation. In an open economy, any 
increase in the tax rate of capital causes a capital outflow to other economies. The lower the 
cost for capital holders to shift capital abroad, which falls with lower capital trade restrictions 
and/or with increasing openness of the economy, the larger the fiscal externality becomes. 
The impact from capital taxes on growth is given by the effect on return on investment. 
Easterly and Rebelo (1993) point out that “it is hard to think of an influence on the private 
rate of return and on the growth rate that is more direct than that of income taxes. If these do 
not affect the rate of growth, what does?”  
Regarding the methodology for empirical estimation, there is a broad consensus today. 
It is generally accepted that econometric problems such as simultaneity, parameter 
heterogeneity and missing variables, which are immanent in this field, need to be properly 
addressed, see Temple (1999). Simultaneity arises because “countries whose incomes are high 
for reasons other than trade may trade more” (Frankel and Romer 1999, p. 379). These 
authors elegantly use geographical variables for the construction of appropriate instruments to 
correct for this bias. Nevertheless, they find that the results of traditional estimations can be 
confirmed, so that policy conclusions do not need to be changed. Following Hall and Jones 
(1999), the study of Frankel and Romer focuses on level effects. However, according to 
Baldwin (1989, 1992) in his response to the EU-common-market studies, the distinction   4
between level and growth effects of trade is a crucial issue. Consequently, the problem of 
simultaneity is also distinct in the two cases. A one-shot (unilateral) increase in productivity 
can plausibly alter a country’s specialization and trade position. But a change in continuous 
productivity growth is normally due to improvements in mainly domestically oriented sectors 
such as research and education. Hence, a higher growth rate is not directly tied to higher trade 
volumes or trade shares. Accordingly, empirical observations on the impact of growth on 
trade shares remain inconclusive. For example, in the period 1993-2000, the US economy 
showed strong growth, which is commonly attributed to domestic factors such as a favourable 
macroeconomic environment and the widespread use of new information technologies. 
However, in the same period the export share increased only slightly from around 10 to 11 
percent. In Japan, growth was much weaker in the same period; nevertheless, the export share 
rose more, from 9 to 11 percent. The difference to Germany is even more striking: there, 
growth was relatively modest in this time period but the export share increased from 22 to 34 
percent!  
A second econometric problem is the pervasive parameter heterogeneity, which arises 
from the use of large samples including very different countries. On the one hand, problems 
of data quality and outliers are well known and can be addressed with appropriate sensitivity 
tests. But on the other hand, there are good reasons to suggest that the mechanisms 
transmitting the impact of trade on growth vary when we compare different countries, notably 
LDCs and leading economies. If theory is richer than is expressed in the current empirical 
studies, the third econometric issue, which is the problem of omitted variables, comes into 
play. It seems to be quite bold to determine growth by a trade variable and some minor 
additional ingredients in one single equation for samples comprising one hundred or even all 
the countries in the world. In particular, the channels through which impulses from trade on 
growth are transmitted remain unspecified. Whereas for developing countries the 
strengthening of market forces might be the main mechanism at work, this effect seems to be 
less important for industrialized countries. In addition, according to new growth theory of the 
open economy, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), the growth effects of trade depend on 
comparative advantage, which varies from country to country. In certain economies, 
comparative advantage can divert resources away from sectors that drive the growth process. 
Finally, the fact that trade is not the only impact factor for growth has to be adequately 
addressed in the estimations. For instance, the correlation between investment rates and 
growth appears to be robust, see Levine and Renelt (1992) and Temple (1999). There is also 
qualified support for the conditional convergence hypothesis, which has dominated the   5
empirical contributions on growth during the last decade, see e.g. Mankiw, Romer and Weil 
(1992) and Barro (1991).  
Reconsidering four of the above cited studies, Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999) conclude 
that open trade policies are not significantly associated with economic growth, once other 
relevant country characteristics are controlled for. Frankel and Romer (1999) comment that, 
in their opinion, trade is a "very noisy proxy for income-promoting interactions". In a similar 
way, Rodriguez and Rodrik (1999, p. 4) suspect that the relationship between trade and 
growth depends on additional characteristics, and they argue that “scrutinizing the channels 
through which trade policies influence economic performance is likely to be more productive” 
before they conclude that “the challenge of identifying the connections between trade policy 
and economic growth is one that still remains before us“ (p. 39).  
The advantage of the emphasis on the tax link as done in this paper is that it can build 
on theories that are derived from microeconomic principles, which contrasts to the above-
mentioned gravity models. The focus on one specific channel between trade and growth does 
not mean that other channels like knowledge spillovers, market efficiency and institutional 
effects are not relevant. However, given the present sample, the tax channel is possibly among 
the most important mechanism at work. 
 
 
3. Model Specification 
Following the causal chain from trade to capital taxes and then to growth, the theoretical 
approach presented here necessarily includes the estimation of two relationships: the first is 
the impact of trade and trade policy on capital taxes, the second of capital taxes on growth. 
The first step thus consists of estimating an equation for the effect of trade and trade policy on 
capital taxes. Marginal costs of capital taxes used to finance public goods are affected by the 
openness of the economy because of the induced capital outflow. Marginal benefits of the 
public goods financed by taxes are determined by individual utility of public services and the 
ideological preferences of the government and the parliament. It is normally postulated that 
conservative governments favour a lower level of public activities and a lower capital 
taxation, while leftist governments favour redistribution and a higher capital taxation. To 
conclude, capital taxes are predicted to be the lower, the more open the economy is and/or the 
lower restrictions on international capital markets are, once the preferences of the government 
are controlled for.    6
Empirical results on international tax competition, see Garrett (1995), Quinn (1997) 
and Swank (1998), long seemed to contradict theory. However, these authors use capital tax 
revenue as a percent of GDP as the variable for tax policy. But since capital tax revenue as a 
percent of GDP equals capital tax rates times the capital base divided by total income, the 
observed relationship is not necessarily incompatible with greater openness reducing the tax 
rate. If, at the same time, openness raises the capital/output ratio and, especially, if it does so 
by means of lower tax rates, a positive impact of globalisation on tax revenue can be 
expected, according to theory. Therefore, effective tax rates are used for estimation below. 
The quality of the first results in this paper is compatible with the outcome in Rodrik (1997), 
where, however, annual data are used, which does not allow the endogenous growth 
perspective taken here. 
The second step of the estimation procedure concerns dynamics. Capital taxes 
decrease the real net return on capital investments. Assuming interest rate-dependent savings 
and constant returns to capital, this lowers the long-term growth rate; with decreasing returns 
to capital, only the medium-run growth rate is negatively affected. In addition, growth 
depends on variables like the size of the R&D sector or the education sector, which are 
influenced by trade. As a consequence of the different effects of trade when countries are very 
different in sectoral structure (see Section 2), we only use countries with similar factor 
endowments and similar market structures for empirical estimation. Right hand variables 
include, aside from capital taxes, the initial income level and the investment rate, as these two 
are generally accepted as important and robust impact factors for the growth rate. Further 
variables in the sprit of new growth theory are not included because of little variation in the 
sample and possible multicollinearity and endogeneity problems. As in the first step, however, 




4. The Data 
Effective tax burden of firms is determined not only by the statutory tax rate but also by the 
determination of the legal tax base, which differs due to complex national differences in tax-
credits, tax-exemptions and tax-deductions for identical operating surpluses. On the other 
hand, capital tax revenue as a share of GDP is an inappropriate indicator, as the tax base and 
income are also affected by trade. For these reasons, effective tax rates are calculated by 
dividing total tax revenues from corporate taxation by the operating surplus of corporate 
enterprises, according to the methodology proposed in the seminal paper of Mendoza, Razin   7
and Tesar (1994).
2 As effective capital tax rates incorporate taxes on immovable properties 
with a very inelastic tax base, corporate taxes are better suited to testing the theoretical 
predictions of the tax competition model. Furthermore, a large share of corporate capital 
belongs to multinational firms and is thus especially mobile. Figure 2 shows the values of 
effective taxes for the 12 countries in the sample. As corporate tax rates are largely 








To measure trade and the openness of an economy, a common variable used in empirical 
studies is calculated as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. For financial 
market liberalisation, most studies use a qualitative measure constructed by analysing inward 
and outward capital and current account restrictions and by regarding international legal 
agreements that constrain a nation’s ability to restrict exchange and capital flows.
3 By 
including both variables (variables open and capital, see below) we acknowledge the fact that 
economies can differ substantially with regard to openness for goods and for capital, as is 
evident in the case of the US. The growth rate of GDP is measured in PPP-US-dollars, while a 
separate variable is introduced for population growth. To test whether ideological preferences 
in the political system influence tax policy, a sum of variables measuring the centre of 
political gravity for electorate, legislature and cabinet, ranging from 3 (far left) to 15 (far 
right) is used.
4 The initial income level and the investment share are standard measures of the 
OECD statistics. 
Data cover 12 OECD countries
5 and range from 1967 to 1996, divided into five year 
periods as follows: 1967-71, 1972-76, 1977-81, 1982-86, 1987-1991 and 1992-96.
6 Since the 
                                                 
2   The data are described in the appendix. 
3   For a more detailed description of the qualitative index used below, see Quinn (1997). 
4   The data are provided by Cusack (1997). 
5   Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden. Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. Unfortunately, for the first years data are not available for all the countries 
considered. To avoid an extremely unbalanced panel, additional countries with fewer observations are not 
considered.   8
panel is relatively short in time dimension, the biases in estimation of a fixed effects model 
could be substantial. On the other hand, Beck and Katz (1995) show the possible deficiencies 
when using GLS estimators for the kinds of panel data used here. However, the Beck and 
Katz (1995) specification of panel corrected standard errors is an appropriate method in this 
case, it has been designed exactly for panels like the one used in this paper. Therefore, this 
method is adopted in the following by using the corresponding PCSE-option in the Stata 
software package. Comparing the present results to the outcome when using the GLS-random-
effects estimator, it turns out that the latter method produces very similar results to the former 




5. Evidence from Panel Data for OECD Countries  
To show evidence for the hypotheses of the theoretical approach, we test the core model of 
tax competition and growth as analysed in the last section. In the equations (5) to (7) of the 
first table, lagged endogenous variables are added because of possible policy inertia. Table 1 
summarizes the results for the impact of trade and trade policy on capital tax rates. Most 
importantly, trade measured by trade shares with the variable open ([imports + exports] / 
GDP) has a negative impact on effective average corporate taxes throughout the estimations. 
This result of a negative and significant impact of trade is very robust with respect to changes 
in specification and sample. The variable for trade policy capital (measuring restrictions on 
payment and receipts of capital) is successful in sign; in the first equations, the standard error 
is too big but significance is given as soon as the lagged endogenous variable is introduced. 
The variable gov  for the centre of political gravity in the political authorities, with an 
increasing value from far left to far right, shows the predicted negative sign; the variable is 
highly significant in the specifications used, with the exception of (7). In equation (3), the 
dummy variable dnoneur for non-European countries is introduced. European countries are 
comparatively small and the size is negatively correlated with openness; this dummy is thus 
another test for the robustness of the variable open. As can be seen, the negative impact of 
openness is unaltered which is also true when introducing the dummy in any other 
specification used. 
                                                                                                                                                          
6   In the study of Kneller et al. on the impact of fiscal policy on growth, which covers 22 OECD countries, also 
five year periods are used.   9
The variable resopen in (3) is used as an alternative for open. As trade shares are 
influenced by the size of an economy, see Figure 1, resopen is the residual of a separate panel 
regression of open on the size of the economies (size) to capture the openness which is above 
average, once the size of the economy is held constant. However, the change in the openness 
variable alters little in the results: the negative and significant impact on corporate taxes 
remains. To conclude, as soon as effective rates are used to measure corporate taxation, the 
predictions of the tax competition model can be found in the five year panel data. Moreover, a 
look at Figure 2 reveals that the results are not driven by some outlying observations in the 
data. In particular, they are not due to outliers in the effective capital tax rates, which occur in 










In Table 2, the empirical results of the second equation are presented. The effect of corporate 
taxes on the growth rate of GDP measured in PPP-US-dollars is negative throughout, as 
predicted. Moreover, the estimated coefficients and standard errors are very stable in the 
different specifications. This is quite an impressive result when we consider the various 
macroeconomic interactions which are important for the dynamics of an open economy. It is 
reasonable to exclude reversed causality because we are using long-term data so that the 
impact of cyclical income changes on governments’ tax policy does not appear in the sample. 
As in other recent growth regressions, the income level at the beginning of the period ilevel is 
negative and significant, whereas the investment share of GDP invest is positive and 
significant in all specifications. The inclusion of population growth popgrowth to control for 
the different population growth rates, especially when comparing the USA and Canada with 
the other countries, has virtually no impact on the estimated coefficients. The political 
variables do not add to the explanation in this case. Neither the ideological preferences gov 
nor the level of government expenditure govexp are able to add to the conclusions. It can thus 
largely be discarded that certain types of allocation policies have simultaneously influenced 
capital taxes and growth. Moreover, scale effects expressed in the size of the economies (size) 
have no impact on the growth rate according to the estimations. 
   10
 






According to our empirical results, trade fosters growth through the negative impact on 
corporate taxes. This outcome confirms earlier studies which find a positive relationship 
between an increasingly globalised environment and the development of a single country. The 
present paper adds to current knowledge by identifying one of the main channels transmitting 
the impulses from trade to growth. To reveal this channel, a two-step estimation procedure is 
inescapable. The transitivity of the two relationships found in the estimations to the basic 
impact of trade on growth is clearly indicated. The co-occurrence of two crucial attributes, 
mobility and accumulation capability, of one single input factor, capital, drives the main 
result. The mechanism applies to physical but not to human capital because of lower mobility 
and different taxation of skilled labour.  
  Of course, the analysed impact on growth is only effective when trade volumes are 
increasing and/or trade restrictions are decreasing. That means the phenomenon vanishes in 
the long run, assuming that international integration gradually continues and then comes to an 
end in the future. But this is not a special attribute of capital taxes; it corresponds to all 
potential mechanisms like international knowledge transmission, competition and institutional 
effects. The conclusions of this paper do not aim to completely leave out these other channels 
of account. It will certainly be rewarding to find similar approaches for other mechanisms at 
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Appendix 
variable description  source  mean  standard 
deviation 
corptax   effective average corporate 
tax rate 
Based on Mendoza 
et al. (1994) 
37.627 13.443 
growth  growth rate of GDP 
measured in PPP-US-dollars
own calculations   2.525  1.499 
gov  sum of center of political 
gravity for electorate, 
legislature, and cabinet 
Cusack (1997)  9.142  1.094 
open  (imports + exports) / GDP  own calculations  0.567  0.275 
capital restrictions  on  payment  and 
receipts of capital 
Quinn (1997)  3.169  0.733 
size   relative country size:   
adj. GDP (country) / adj. 
GDP (average) 
own calculations  100  147.958 
ilevel  income level   own calculations  14.630  3.577 
invest  investment share of GDP  own calculations  22.558  4.205 
govexp  government expenditure as a 
share of GDP  
own calculations  13.775  3.731 
popgrowth  population growth rate  own calculations  0.0056  0.0040 




















































































































































































   15
 











































































  (4.81) 
 
-21.22*** 



















































































































































Standard errors in parentheses; 









































































































































































































































Standard errors in parentheses; 
*,**,*** for significance at the 10, 5, 1 % level (two-tailed test)   
 
Table 2 
 
 